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The Mirror of Anarchy: The egoism of John Henry Mackay and Dora Marsden
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Ruth Kinna 
 
Introduction 
Stirner occupies a curious place in the history of anarchist ideas. Although he has 
been identified as a central figure in histories of anarchist thought, he is probably the 
least celebrated of the nineteenth-century thinkers. Disquiet about Stirner‟s place in 
the canon was apparent as early as the 1880s and „90s, the period of Stirner‟s revival. 
Although important figures like Max Nettlau attempted to negotiate the differences 
between individualists and communists, Kropotkin and Malatesta both advanced 
strong criticisms of growing egoist trends.
2
 Even writers who admired Nietzsche, with 
whom Stirner‟s work was frequently associated in anarchist circles, were prone to 
attack Stirner. In review for Mother Earth Max Baginski, dismissed the celebration of 
his work a „harmless bourgeois cult‟ and compared it unfavourably to Nietzshe‟s.3 It 
is perhaps symbolic of the awkwardness anarchists felt about Stirner‟s contribution 
that no drawing of him appeared on the cover of the Freedom edition of Paul 
Eltzbacher‟s study of the seven sages: uniquely his name is set in the frame of a blank 
box.  
As the black sheep of anarchism, Stirner has sometimes been used as a cipher 
in ideological polemics. He remains a favourite subject of anti-anarchist critique, still 
used by Marxists to illustrate the destructive individualism said to lie at the heart of 
anarchist thought.
4
 Voices aligned to class-struggle anarchism have similarly recruited 
Stirner in their battles to drive a wedge between anarcho-communist and individualist 
positions. In his defence of platformism, Alexandre Skirda links egoism to illegalism 
with some justification, but also, and less justifiably, to intellectual bankruptcy and 
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personal and strategic failure.
5
 Michael Schmidt and Lucien van der Walt argue that 
Stirner was anti-socialist and anti-revolutionary. They place him outside the „broad 
anarchist tradition‟.6 Contemporary scholars who have given sustained attention to 
Stirner‟s political thought have been kinder to him. Nevertheless, Stirner continues to 
be used to as a mirror to reflect on the shortcomings of anarchism. Saul Newman‟s 
analysis of Stirner appears, at least in part, to have been driven by a desire to illustrate 
the shortcomings of anarchism. Rather than raising a critique of Stirner‟s work to 
reflect on anarchism, he instead mounts a defence.  
The strangeness of the place Stirner occupies as the reprobate architect of 
anarchist thought is matched by the consensus about his individualism. Interestingly, 
since he defends Stirner, Newman sketches the grounds of class-struggle anarchist 
concerns when he comments on Stirner‟s „extreme individualism and egoism‟. This 
extremism, he argues, amounted to a tendency to treat any „collective identity‟ as „an 
oppressive burden‟, a position which leaves little room „to theorize a collective 
politics of resistance‟. Stirner talked about the „Unity of Egos‟, but Newman hints that 
his politics might be „limited to individual rebellion‟.7 Some scholars have suggested 
that such assessments of Stirner are mistaken and that they stem from a fundamental 
misunderstanding of nineteenth-century traditions. Allan Antliff‟s work on 
modernism shows that the creative impulse that Newman associates with Stirnerite 
autonomy had a central place in anarcho-communist thought and that ideas now 
attributed to Stirner were common currency in early twentieth-century anarchist 
movements and well-embedded in so-called classical traditions.
8
 Antliff‟s fire is 
directed towards Newman, but insofar as it identifies a misrepresentation, it has equal 
application to anti-individualist critiques. 
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The correspondence of Newman‟s critical assessment of egoism with anti-
individualist class struggle anarchism is puzzling and, as Antliff‟s work indicates, 
points to the possibility of an interrelationship in communist and individualist 
traditions that both parties to the debate are keen to resist. To consider this possibility 
and the parameters of the individualist-communist divide, I follow Newman in 
treating Stirnerism as a mirror through which to reflect on anarchism. However, 
whereas Newman presents an analysis of Stirner‟s work to abstract a critique of 
anarchism, I develop a model of Stirnerism from late nineteenth and early twentieth-
century sources and show how egoist critique reflects on this model. The picture of 
Stirnerism it paints is quite different from the one Newman finds and more porous to 
the sorts of exchanges Antliff identifies. The paper begins with an account of 
Newman‟s defence and then proceeds to a discussion of J.H. Mackay and Dora 
Marsden.  
 
Newman: Stirner and anarchism 
The idea which emerges most forcefully from Saul Newman‟s defence of Stirner is 
difference. Stirner‟s work, he argues, attacked the liberal idea that „every kind of 
particularity and difference must be overcome‟.9 Stirner showed that liberalism 
involves the „progressive “taming” of the individuals – a restriction of his difference 
and singularity‟.10 He argued, rightly, that „individuals who deviate from the accepted 
moral and rational norms of liberalism are excluded from the liberal polity‟. Worse, 
that in liberalism „the individual himself is split between an identification with liberal 
subjectivity, and a recognition of those elements of himself which do not or cannot 
confirm to this ideal‟.11 Individuals are expected to „conform to a certain rational 
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mode of freedom‟, based on „a false universality and neutrality which masks its 
complicity with power‟:12  
 
Freedom and autonomy are conditional upon the individual conforming to an 
abstract generality, therefore denying his difference and individuality. Those 
who do not or cannot live up to this ideal are excluded, marginalized and 
subjected to a whole series of regulatory, judicial, medical and disciplinary 
procedures which have as their aim the normalization of the individual. Stirner 
may therefore be seen as a crucial link in the post-Enlightenment and 
poststructuralist critique of liberalism – particularity his questioning of the 
conditions under which the liberal subject is constituted.
13
 
 
Whilst the thrust of Stirner‟s critique seems to be anti-liberal, Newman finds its 
normative promise in what he calls its „“hyper-liberalism”‟. Stirner‟s response to 
restrictive liberalism was to explode its boundaries. He saw individuality as „a radical 
excess … something that spills over its edges and jeopardizes [liberalism‟s] limits.14 It 
was up to each individual, therefore, „go beyond the formal freedoms of liberalism 
and invent his own forms of autonomy‟. Liberals, Newman argues, must acknowledge 
that rights and freedoms are not founded on „some universal, essential subjectivity, 
but on a series of arbitrary exclusions, discursive constructions and strategies of 
power‟.15 They must, then, abandon the search for „a universal epistemological 
standpoint – to find the best form of life from which others can be judged‟. Newman‟s 
attack is directed against Rawlsians and it leads him to embrace John Gray‟s 
„agonistic liberalism‟. Rather than „search for a rational consensus about the “best 
life”‟, he argues, we should recognise the „incommensurability of different 
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perspectives in modern society‟.16 This form of radical pluralism acknowledges the 
„irreducibility of difference‟ and the establishment of „a modus vivendi between 
competing forms of life‟.17 In a practical sense, it does not lead to an abandonment of 
formal rights and freedoms but their extension to groups and identities that liberalism 
– in the name of universality - currently excludes.  
Whilst Newman uses this analysis of Stirner to attack Rawlsian liberalism, the 
critique is also relevant to traditional forms of socialism, including anarchism. The 
argument rests on Stirner‟s characterisation of enlightenment thinking which, as 
Newman acknowledges, emerges through his critique of Feuerbach. To show how 
Stirner breaks with the tradition of enlightenment Humanism, he outlines three 
movements of a counter-dialectic presented in Stirner‟s classic work, The Ego and Its 
Own.
18
 The first phase is marked by the emergence of „political liberalism‟ and the 
claim for formal equality of rights. For Stirner, Newman argues, this involves the 
construction of a „general anonymous political identity … - the citizen‟- and rather 
than giving individuals autonomy from the state, it binds them to it.
19
 The second 
movement, „social liberalism‟, demands the extension of political rights to the social 
and economic sphere and is associated with the socialist demand for the abolition of 
property rights. Newman argues: „behind this discourse of social and economic 
equality for all, there is a pernicious and hidden resentment of individual 
difference‟.20 On Stirner‟s account, social liberalism is only a demand for levelling.21  
The final phase of the dialectic – „humane liberalism‟ - overcomes the contradiction 
between the drive for autonomy that Stirner locates in property or „ownness‟ and the 
demand for economic equality by imposing a duty to subordinate self-interest to the 
common good. The goal of the humane liberal is to achieve a „state of perfection and 
harmony‟ and the cost is that all individual differences are finally transcended.22 
Comment [s1]: I think I was referring 
more to Nietzsche here, and his 
parallels with Stirner, rather than Stirner 
himself.  Stirner doesn;t really have a 
notion of slave morality or a ‘slave 
mentality’.. maybe you could rephrase 
this..? Perhaps simply: <On Stirner’s 
account, social liberalism is only a 
demand for levelling.> 
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Even though it rejected the state, Newman argues that anarchism was fully 
immersed in this humane-enlightenment tradition. Instead of thinking of individuals 
as right-bearers, anarchists cast them as essentially rational, and sociable. These 
essential characteristics encouraged the anarchists to parallel Stirner‟s counter-
dialectic with a utopian vision framed by a rejection of liberalism. Taking issue with 
the claims that political liberals advanced about the citizen, the anarchists argued that 
freedom lay in state‟s abolition. Yet accepting the humane liberal position, anarchists 
argued that the condition for this liberation lay in the achievement of social and 
economic equality. Where political liberals saw the ethical state as the vehicle through 
which the tensions between individual and society could be resolved, the anarchists 
identified the social, cultural, religious and economic inequalities that the state upheld 
as the cause of artificial division between naturally co-operative social beings. The 
conditions for harmony were entirely opposite, but the ideal was the same. Anarchists 
and liberals shared a singular conception of humankind and both were equally 
intolerant of individual difference. 
 Newman‟s argument has been powerfully persuasive, but as Antliff argues, the 
claim that the critique accurately captures a dominant anarchist view is dubious. In 
distancing themselves from egoism, oppositional anarchists did not thereby endorse 
the positions Stirner associated with enlightenment humanism. Indeed, it is not even 
clear that the terms of debate were framed in the way that Newman suggests. To 
consider how they were framed, I turn to the work of two of Stirner‟s leading 
advocates, John Henry Mackay and Dora Marsden.  
 
 
 
Comment [s2]: If you are referring to 
my argument here, I think in From 
Bakunin to Lacan I associate anarchism 
more with the ‘humane liberal’ position 
than the ‘social liberal position’ (which I 
associate with socialism) 
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Stirnerism at the turn of the twentieth century 
John Henry MacKay (1864-1933) and Dora Marsden (1882-1960) are both excellent 
guides to turn-of-the-century Stirnerism. MacKay was a writer and poet who actively 
campaigned for homosexual rights and the abolition of the age of consent. Using the 
pseudonym „Sagitta‟ he wrote a number of books to encourage acceptance of inter-
generational sex or „man-boy love‟. Of these, The Hustler was the most clearly 
propagandistic and written from an overtly anarchist perspective.
23
 However, he is 
probably better known as the author of The Anarchists, a fictionalised account of his 
experiences in the London anarchist movement in 1887-8. This book was written 
before Mackay became acquainted with Stirner‟s writings, but its success helped seal 
his reputation as a leading interpreter of Stirner‟s thought. Subsequently recognising 
the coincidence of views, Mackay became a keen advocate of Stirner‟s work and set 
about collecting his papers. When Richard Strauss first thought about setting some of 
MacKay‟s poetry to music in the 1890s, he described him as the „great anarchist and 
biographer of the Berlin philosopher Max Stirner‟.24 Kropotkin also credited him with 
bringing Stirner into prominence,
25
 a claim Mackay endorsed: „What would one know 
of today of Max Stirner and his life without me?‟ he asked. His answer: 
„”Nothing!”‟.26  
Like MacKay, Dora Marsden had already moved toward egoism before she 
read Stirner and it was a measure of her respect for his ideas that she declined to label 
herself a follower. „If the beer bears a resemblance in flavour to other brands‟ she 
argued, „it is due to the similarity of taste in the makers‟.27 Marsden‟s egoism did not 
attract such a wide audience as MacKay‟s, but as a former member of the Women‟s 
Social and Political Union who had broken ranks with Pankhursts in 1911, Marsden 
established her reputation by engaging in a series of „daredevil acts of militancy‟ – 
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which included „throwing balls labelled “bomb” through the windows of political 
meetings‟.28 And as the editor of The Freewoman, New Freewoman and The Egoist, 
she communicated a rich diet of Stirnerite ideas to cultural and literary avant gardes 
on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition to activists like Edward Carpenter and Guy 
Aldred, contributors to the journals included Rebecca West, James Joyce, D.H. 
Lawrence and Ezra Pound. A very public dispute with Benjamin Tucker helped 
establish the authoritativeness of her voice and in The Egoist she not only exposed the 
gulf between her Stirnerism and the Proudhonian version to which Tucker subscribed, 
she also developed a clear, if biting, generalised critique of anarchism. 
John Mackay regarded himself as an anarchist and in common with a number 
of individualists active in the late nineteenth-century, he argued that anarchism was a 
necessarily individualist doctrine which was incompatible with communist ideas. The 
account he gave of the two doctrines indicate his sense of their irreconcilability. 
Anarchy, he argued, meant the abolition of the state, of artificial boundaries, the 
bureaucracy, the military and the judiciary; it meant the freedom of individuals to 
determine and pursue their own interests, consistent with the equal liberty of all. In 
anarchy, individuals would be free to live their private lives as they saw fit and to 
experiment without limit. Anarchy also spelt the end of technical languages - in 
diplomacy, finance, medicine - openness in communication and the development of 
free schools. In economics, it was based on the abolition of monopoly, free exchanges 
of goods and ideas and open access to all natural resources. In anarchy, individuals 
would receive the full value of their labour and were free to fix its price. Work would 
be the only source of value and the best goods would be offered for sale at the lowest 
possible price. Because it was just, Mackay argued, anarchy promised the 
disappearance of crime and poverty. Mackay believed that communism was an 
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altogether different prospect and whether or not it was called anarchist it was, in fact, 
a celebration of the state.  
Communism was the negation of all this. Mackay associated it with the 
subordination of private interests to the public good, the regimentation of public 
services (economic planning and the direction of labour, the nationalisation of 
industry) as well as the regulation of family life, including marriage and reproduction. 
It offered no scope for freedom of expression or artistic licence and instead required 
that science, art and learning be governed to satisfy the interests of the state. In The 
Anarchists, he linked communism with the doctrines of equality first elaborated by 
Babeuf .
29
 It was not surprising, then, that he echoed Proudhon‟s description of 
government to characterise communism as a system of surveillance, examination, 
spying and control. Communists pictured communism as heaven on earth, but in 
reality it meant only boredom, restriction and dull uniformity.
30
 
 One of Mackay‟s chief worries about communism was that it entailed the 
close monitoring of private life. As Kennedy notes, it would be „simplistic to suppose 
that Mackay‟s realization that his sexual orientation was irreconcilable with modern 
society led him to advocate anarchism‟, but his homosexuality and his promotion of 
man-boy love influenced his politics, nonetheless.
31
 Thomas Riley, Mackay‟s 
biographer, argues that Mackay‟s attraction to Stirner was forged by his sense of the 
brutality of life (he described old age as „an undignified struggle for every next day 
without the prospect for improvement‟)32 - a feeling reinforced by the hardship of 
being a social outcast and sexual outlaw.
33
 The complexity of his identity overlapped 
with anarchism in two particular ways. On the one hand, his active campaigning for 
emancipation made him acutely aware of the social tensions of personal freedom. 
These tensions, he concluded, could only be mitigated, not resolved. „”Life itself will 
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find a solution‟”, he said.34 Whatever the costs, it was better that disputes were left to 
the process of living than given to the judgements of particular individuals, since the 
latter could never act flexibly and would always fix the boundaries of acceptable 
behaviour in repressive codes. On the other hand, Mackay‟s sense of disadvantage 
encouraged him to conceptualise freedom in terms of a human capacity to love or to 
realise what he called „destiny‟.  
Mackay‟s ideal was free love: the „freedom to “unite in love with any other 
being to whom he is drawn, if he finds mutual love there, and be allowed to separate 
from this being at any time, when the attraction no longer exists”‟.35 His 
understanding of this arrangement was not contractual in a narrowly legalistic sense, 
though free love was based on explicit consent. Love, as Riley notes, meant for 
Mackay „the right to satisfy his love longings, and to give love where it was needed 
(as he felt)‟.36 In later life Mackay argued: „Each strives constantly, uniquely, and 
alone for his own happiness (and then all the more if he believes to find it “in 
others”‟).37 This idea of love‟s drives left space for irrationality, emotional 
enslavement and exploitation. Mackay depicted precisely this condition in The 
Hustler, describing the torture that the lovelorn hero Herman experiences as a result 
of Gunther‟s juvenile, uncaring, instrumentalism and, ultimately, Gunther‟s 
psychological destruction at the point of the relationship‟s demise. The priority 
Mackay assigned to love resonated with Oscar Wilde‟s idea of personality: both 
argued that individuals should have the latitude to „be themselves‟.38 Yet whereas 
Wilde linked personality to inner peace, using Christ as his model, Mackay associated 
it with risk and tied its expression to boldness, courage and assertion. He probed this 
idea in the conclusion to The Hustler, when Hermann attempts to come to terms with 
the collapse of his affair with the teenager and rises above the public shame of his 
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conviction for indecent assault. The female relative who lends him her support tells 
Hermann that pederasty: „is your destiny … Neither oppose it, nor bow down under it. 
Neither will help you to the only happiness that there is for you. Make a peace treaty 
with it, and direct it. Then you will conquer it and only in that way‟.39 She continues: 
„Let it be light – your love ... And do not question! … Since it stands outside of all 
laws and morals of peoples, it is freer and – perhaps also more beautiful for it‟.40 
The critique of anarcho-communism that Mackay presented in The Anarchists 
was not a crude attempt to brush it with the tar of communist repression. 
Nevertheless, the conclusions he drew from his experiences in London led him to 
believe that anarcho-communist doctrines would inevitably result in the creation of a 
repressive and oppressive statist system. Anarcho-communists were not disingenuous, 
they were deluded; and to show the dangers of the doctrines they espoused Mackay 
set out to expose their utopianism.  
Mackay presented his analysis through two main characters: Conrad Auban and 
Otto Trupp. Meeting up in London, these former comrades discover that their views 
have drifted apart: Auban has adopted an individualist position whilst Trupp remains 
mired in communism. Mackay identified Trupp‟s view as Bakuninist, but he also 
associated anarcho-communist utopianism with Kropotkin and William Morris. 
Although he was sensitive to the differences between them he argued that they shared 
a trust in abstract thought and a yearning for ideal community. For example, Bakunin 
was a romantic idealist. The „shapeless structure of a general philosophy … 
shimmering with promise‟ underpinned his „ideal of brotherly love‟ and it wrongly 
led him to the conviction that the reality matched with „sufficient clearness what he 
aspires after‟.41 Kropotkin „had attempted to lay down the “scientific foundations” of 
his ideal‟ and, unable to see the „delusive faith‟ he placed in them, was also unable to 
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foresee the „evil harvest of despotism, confusion and … intense misery‟ they would 
reap.
42
 Morris spoke as a poet rather than a scientist and his communism was built on 
hope: „”How beautiful it would be if it could be so – how everything would be 
dissolved in harmony and peace‟”. Auban believed such hope ran against reason and 
called it „something evil‟.43 Thinking through him, Mackay summed up Morris‟s 
„picture of the free society‟ as „enticingly and delusively‟ fictional as Bakunin‟s or 
Kropotkin‟s.44 None of them were able to grasp reality and all of them consequently 
believed that the elaborate fiction of harmony and fellowship they identified with 
anarchy was not only possible but that it ought to be put into practice. This is the 
charge that Auban puts to Trupp: 
 
… you have forced an ideal of a future of happiness which corresponds most 
nearly to your own inclinations, wishes, habits. By naming it “the ideal of 
humanity” you are convinced that every “real and true man” must be just as 
happy under it as you. You would fain make your ideal the idea of all.... I on the 
contrary, want liberty which will enable each to live according to his ideas. I 
want to be let alone, I want to be spared from any demands that may be made in 
the name of “the ideal of humanity”.45  
 
Mackay identified the principle of community that lay at the heart of 
communism as a religious idea: it demanded faith in the possibility of a future 
transformation – akin to the promise of life after death; obedience to those who were 
able to picture the vision of earthly paradise; and, above all, a duty to sacrifice all in 
the pursuit of the cause.
46
 Nechaev was the archetypal communist revolutionary and 
Trupp was made in his mould. Mackay described Trupp as someone who had learned 
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„by heart, those mad eleven principles “concerning the duties of the revolutionist to 
himself and to his fellow-revolutionists,” which begins with the frightful worlds of the 
greatest illiberality: “The revolutionist is a self-immolated person …”.47 Like 
Nechaev, Trupp is a „fanatic of fantasy‟48 who extols terrorism as a means of 
revolutionary struggle because he believes that the particular sacrifices it demands are 
the noblest test of revolutionary commitment. His conviction points to a separation of 
the means and ends of revolutionary struggle which Mackay regarded as self-
defeating. „[T]hese people‟, Auban declares „make a point of excelling each other in 
sacrifices and of seeking their pride not in victory, but in defeat! Sacrifice upon 
sacrifice!‟.49 Yet Mackay did not identify the flaw of communist-anarchism in its 
utilitarianism alone. Anarchist-communist religiosity had an emotional dimension: 
Trupp and his ilk were sentimentalists who pitied the needy and oppressed.
50
 This 
theme also emerged in The Hustler: Mackay described Herman‟s pity for Gunther‟s 
impoverishment as „that most dangerous of all matchmakers of love‟.51 Just as 
Herman‟s sentiments confuse him, blinding him to the physical basis of his attraction, 
in The Anarchists Trupp‟s sense of injustice leads him to believe, wrongly, that his 
duty is to others, rather than to himself. He thinks that he is responsible for delivering 
the downtrodden from their misery. As Mackay puts it: Trupp „had lost himself more 
and more in the generality of mankind … had placed himself at the service of his 
cause and felt as belonging to it in life and in death‟.52 Trupp‟s compassion is a 
measure of the degree to which he has become a slave to his fantastic ideal, and whilst 
it leads him to justify the most outrageous violence and to give himself up in service 
to the oppressed, Auban is more disturbed to see that his pity justifies the imposition 
of similar obligations on others. For Mackay this position was untenable and he 
illustrated the perversity of Trupp‟s thinking in a discussion of the Haymarket 
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martyrs, where his subservience to the cause leads him to support the judicial murder 
of the convicted men and to reject their petition for a pardon as treachery.
53
 Shortly 
after this episode, Auban tells Trupp: 
 
Continue to throw your bombs, and continue to suffer hanging for it, if you will 
never grow wise. I am the last to deny the suicide the right of destroying 
himself. But you preach your policy as a duty toward mankind, while you do 
not exemplify it in your lives. It is that against which I protest. You assume a 
tremendous responsibility: the responsibility for the life of others.
54
  
 
In the end, Mackay argued, the contradictions of the anarchist-communist 
position were impossible for any human to bear. For all his revolutionary zeal, Trupp 
calls on others to fulfil the duty that he believes to be incumbent on him because he 
cannot tolerate the harms that his cause requires him to commit. His compassion and 
pity were real, but they lead him to lose touch with his sense of justice. He goes mad. 
Auban observes: 
 
Firery, enthusiastic, devoted, he lived only for the cause. He could have given 
his life for it, and he found no other way than that of a “deed”. He had been 
influenced by passionate speeches and inspiring promises. But his nature shrank 
from violence and bloodshed, revolted. And in the long struggle between what 
seemed to him as his holiest duty and that nature which made its fulfilment an 
impossibility, his mind gave way.
55
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Whilst Mackay dedicated The Anarchists to his friend Benjamin Tucker and 
believed that there was an affinity between his egoism and Tucker‟s individualism, 
Dora Marsden elaborated her ideas precisely in order to distinguish her position from 
Tucker‟s. Marsden‟s argument with Tucker erupted some thirty years after Mackay 
outlined his critique of anarcho-communism and it coincided with the appearance of 
the London edition of The Ego and Its Own in 1912. The row was provoked by an 
article Tucker published about Proudhon and the role that contract might play in a 
future anarchist society. Under Stirner‟s influence, Tucker had abandoned his 
theoretical commitment to natural rights, thrown out all notion of „duty‟ and adopted 
in its place a theory of social convention.
56
 Yet prompted by the distortion of 
Proudhon‟s work at the hands of Leon Daudet and the French neo-royalists of the 
Cercle Proudhon, Tucker was keen to show that Proudhon‟s critique of Rousseau‟s 
social contract was not tantamount to the rejection of contract - certainly not in favour 
of monarchic oaths of allegiance.
57
 In this, he argued that there was indeed a role for 
contract and quoted approvingly from Proudhon‟s General Idea of the Revolution in 
the Nineteenth Century: 
The law is clear, the sanction still more so. Three articles, which make but one - 
that is the whole social contract. Instead of making oath to God and his prince, 
the citizen swears upon his conscience, before his brothers, and before 
Humanity. Between these two oaths there is the same difference as between 
slavery and liberty, faith and science, courts and justice, usury and labour, 
government and economy, non-existence and being, God and man.
58
 
Endorsing Proudhon‟s argument, Tucker added the following rider: 
 16 
Leaving out the words "good," "wicked, " "brute," and "Humanity," which are 
mere surplusage here, this extract, I think, would have been acceptable even to 
Max Stirner as a charter for his "Union of the Free," - an appreciation of the 
importance of which is necessary to a complete appreciation of Stirner's 
political philosophy. If Miss Marsden knows of any idea originating in America, 
or developed there, of greater moment or larger dimensions than that presented 
in this page from France, she will do me a very great service in pointing it out.
59
 
Tucker‟s invitation only attracted Marsden‟s scorn. She replied:  
 
When therefore Mr. Benj. R. Tucker challenges us … to find him an idea born 
in America bigger than Proudhon's outlined Social Contract, we are inclined to 
give it up. It is a thing difficult to accomplish … It is, in fact, a very dragon, big 
and very impossible in everything except words. If we outlined a scheme for 
building a block of flats as high as St. Paul's with lily-stalks for materials, and 
carefully went into the joys of living therein, and assessed the penalty for 
occupants who damaged the joinery, may we say, we should consider we were 
doing something very similar to that which Proudhon does in outlining the 
social contract. It need not be asserted in the pages of THE NEW 
FREEWOMAN that we consider Proudhon was a blazing light in a dark age, 
but the passage quoted by Mr. Tucker, we think, shows him at his worst.
60
 
 
Marsden‟s comments are sometimes interpreted as a straightforward rejection of 
contract.
61
 However, although she believed that contracts were only made to be 
broken, (in The Egoist she argued that „it is as natural to make contacts … as it is for 
men to laugh, talk and sigh or dogs to bark‟), her position was more nuanced.62 In 
Comment [s3]: Should this be 
<break>? No – she’s trying to point up 
the futility of contract through the 
persistence of the habit – individuals 
seduced by the concept 
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part, as Tucker realised, her concern was not with the substance of Proudhon‟s claim 
but the form of its expression. To be seduced, as Tucker had been, by „the theatricality 
of Proudhon‟s style‟, „with its faked matter and pompous manner … [o]ne would have 
to imagine oneself Cromwell refusing the crown‟, she mocked.63 In the other part, 
Marsden questioned the assumptions that underpinned Proudhon‟s position. The 
reference to „lily-stalks‟, she explained, was designed to point out the fiction of his 
conception of human nature. The „kind of people he describes never walked on earth: 
… they were unreal: figures with no genuine insides, stuffed out with tracts from the 
Church of Humanity and the Ethical Society‟.64 
Both aspects of Marden‟s critique were central to her rejection of anarchism and 
explained her willingness to accept Tucker‟s designation of her view as „archist‟. She 
generalised it by advancing two principle claims. The first was that anarchists failed 
to acknowledge the partiality of their politics. Anarchism was merely an „interest‟ and 
like all others it was locked in a competitive struggle for power. Its success hinged on 
the anarchists‟ ability to excite popular passions, lure and encourage others to „desert 
their own greyer interests‟ for the „throb, the colour, the vividness‟ of the 
alternative.
65
 This attack was similar to Mackay‟s but whereas he pinpointed the 
particular dangers of anarchist-communism in its irrational, utopian appeals, Marsden 
was more concerned to expose its generic failures. Her general critique of political 
movements predated her spat with Tucker. It was the „“Woman Movement”‟ that first 
drew her fire and led her to conclude that political causes typically dominated their 
members, breeding passivity and stultification. In The New Freewoman, she argued: 
 
… the individual must give her energy to the cause. Propaganda started to teach 
women what they owed to the “Cause”: the “duty” of draining their stream of 
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energy into the dam: to “concentrate” on the idea: to sink individual differences; 
to do just those things which makes the intelligent stupid. The blight of the 
“leader” has brought the “movement” to a standstill. The “Women‟s 
Movement” is the “Women‟s Halt”.66  
 
Marsden did not dismiss the anarchists‟ formal rejection of hierarchy and was 
not insensitive to the differences between anarchism and other political ideologies but 
argued that the weakness of political movements applied equally to the anarchists as 
any other. In politics, she argued, movements typically drew on moral sentiments in 
the furtherance of their causes. Each „new “leader” has his “precept” for the guidance 
of the faithful: the “pattern” according to which they must work‟.67 Even without 
leaders, the anarchists did not depart from this model.  
The second strand of her critique was that the anarchists confused human with 
humane behaviours and by inscribing the former with qualities associated with the 
latter demanded that individuals love, sympathise and support each other as a 
condition for social interaction. Anarchists were not alone in this: other socialists and 
humanitarians made the same mistake and she dubbed them all „embargoists‟: they 
„endeavour to lay the weight of their “ought” across other people‟s fads, and 
endeavour to inhibit them by an appeal to the conscience‟.68 Against this, Marsden 
argued that individuals had drives or instincts – what she sometimes called spirit or 
soul - and that the free society was one in which these were simply given free reign. 
Her position was similar to Mackay‟s but she diverged from him both in her 
characterisation of these drives and her anticipation of the ways in which they played 
out in the social realm. Specifically, where he identified love as a central drive, 
Marsden saw only motion. Her view had a Hobbesian tinge: individuals were moved 
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by particular tastes and were able to realise their desires by the exercise of will. 
Bargains with others depended on individuals‟ competence (to employ, for example, 
„fraud, deception, misrepresentation, bounce, swagger, “honest” miscalculation‟); and 
„rights‟ attached to promises were enforced only by might.69 Although she rejected 
the idea that individuals were pleasure-seekers (on the grounds that „pleasure‟ was too 
vague to define), she nevertheless defined behaviours as hedonistic. This allowed her 
to imagine the possibility of other-regarding behaviours whilst maintaining that the 
only relevant distinction between actions was the ease or hardship with which they 
were undertaken: to „“please” oneself is to set one‟s energies moving in a channel in 
which they run readily and with comfort … to sacrifice oneself is to set them on 
enterprises where they move reluctantly and with hardship‟.70 However, the 
construction of Marsden‟s theory was certainly not Hobbesian. Whereas he elaborated 
his concept of man in a fictional state of nature, she situated the ego in the socialised 
state. The change of context was significant because instead of conceptualising nature 
in the abstract, she assumed that individual interests supported social interactions. Her 
concern was to highlight the ways in which these interactions became habituated, how 
custom gave way to culture and civilisation to stifle the ego – reversing the 
relationship between anarchy and order that Hobbes presented.  
Like Mackay, Marsden concluded that order was the norm to which most 
individuals subscribed and that woolly anarchist (for him, anarcho-communist) 
concepts of care and mutual support provided platforms for a repression as severe as 
Hobbes‟s, differing only in the means of regulation it employed. Yet reserving no 
special place for love in the measurement of freedom, Marsden identified the 
assertion of will as its only instrument. The American rebels of the 1770s were one 
model: „no large servant class amongst them [t]hey came from a picked stock; self-
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assertive and powerful; too powerful to brook control‟.71 Emptying hedonism of 
content, she also jettisoned the basic equality that Mackay‟s conception of the ego 
assumed. Not everyone, she argued, had the „genius and charm‟ to assert their 
interests.
72
 Some were too stupid or supine – the crowd – and others were 
insufficiently wilful and rightly suffered the herd‟s strictures. Her reasoning resulted 
in some startling judgements. For example, she was reasonably favourably disposed 
to syndicalism. Describing the syndicalist as „an anarchist crossed with a mild egoist 
strain‟, she characterised the willingness to engage in sabotage as a sign of self-
assertion:  
 
In “sabotage,” or in the conception of the general strike, there is a faint 
realisation that to win large shares in the world‟s spoils working men must be 
ready to string their hearts and consciences up to the pitch of being despoilers. 
To hold one‟s own purposes so much in esteem as to be prepared to push others 
to the rear in their interest is a first sign of power.
73
 
 
Equally surprising was her assessment of Oscar Wilde. Now celebrated for his 
defiant transgression, Marsden judged him as insufficiently egoistical. „For a dazzling 
intelligence to suffer itself to be shamed to death by the rabble‟, she noted, „is a 
shocking and offensive thing‟. Nevertheless, Wilde only had himself to blame: „a 
brilliantly audacious and adventurous life, only half-self-conscious, and consequently 
only half-expressed, must of its very nature invite it‟.74  
In the period she edited The Egoist, Marsden‟s thought evolved from „literal to 
linguistic‟ rebellion and she became increasingly preoccupied with the restrictions of 
language.
75
 Words, she argued, had „grown into masters of all and servant of none‟, 
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their „origins lost through the great multitude of their begetters‟. Used without 
precision, language had become stupefying, „a magic mesh which neither screens nor 
lights up the mind‟. By their repeated, careless use of particular words – „liberty‟, 
„equality‟, „fraternity‟, for example – generations of philosophers had invested some 
words with special mystery or „prestige‟. Their words „have grown great and climbed 
high to secure all the heavenly seats‟. No matter how critically it was applied, 
inherited language only commanded, tyrannised and enslaved. Marsden continued: 
„“In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was God,” they will say.‟ The point, 
however, was to „blast the Word, and reduce it to its function of instrument‟. Only this 
would bring „the enfranchisement of the human kind: the imminent new assertion of 
its next reach in power‟.76  
Marsden acknowledged that anarchist politics represented a break with existing 
social arrangements, but the change it promised was quite different from the one she 
looked for and it took the form of a substitution rather than a transformation. The 
precept of the anarchists – or clerico-libertarians as she called them – was liberty and 
respect for the liberty of others.
77
 Their aim was to eradicate class difference and the 
system of benevolent charity that it supported, but in achieving this, the anarchists 
would only institutionalise a principle of mutual support in liberty‟s name. Just 
another form of „embargoism‟, anarchism threatened to smother individuals in a 
regime of moral rules, rituals and taboos, inculcated through language, culture and 
tradition just as all previous embargos had done. Anarchism appeared to be radical 
but, she argued, this was just an illusion: 
 
Opposition to the “State” because it is the “State” is futile: a negative, unending 
fruitless labour. “What I want is my state: if I am not able to establish that, it is 
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not my concern whose State is established: my business was and still remains 
the establishing of my own. The world should be moulded to my desire if I 
could so mould it: failing in that, I am not to imagine that there is to be no world 
at all: others more powerful than I will see to that.
78
  
   
 
Egoism and the politics of anarchism 
The undeniably rich interpretations of Stirner that Mackay and Marsden offer are 
deeply provocative, but their critiques differ in important respects. As a subscriber to 
The Freewoman and The New Freewoman, Mackay would have been familiar with 
Marsden‟s work, though his correspondence with Tucker gives no indication of his 
assessment. Whilst he also attempted to subscribe to The Egoist, the issues seem 
never to have been delivered.
79
 As Tucker‟s friend, it is likely that Mackay would 
have been unsympathetic to the tone of Marden‟s critique, but there were in any case 
significant differences between them. Although many of the themes Marsden 
explored were common to Mackay these differences affected the way in which they 
conceptualised egoism, their understandings of egoist union and their perceptions of 
anarchism‟s shortcomings.  
At the centre of Mackay‟s egoism is a concept of man that is comparable to 
liberal thought. In the public sphere, man is a right-bearer and self-owner, with a 
sense of justice and a capacity to reason. Thus, Auban jettisons the romanticism that 
enslaves Trupp, but retains a legitimate „faith in the slowly, slowly acting power of 
reason, which will finally lead every man, instead of providing for others, to provide 
for himself‟.80 Having freed himself from socialism – „the last general stupidity of 
mankind‟81 – he realises that „justice … has become the only rightful guide and 
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director in our lives‟.82 His negative freedom requires only that the artificial barriers 
of state and monopoly are removed for justice to be realised. Admittedly, in the 
private sphere, the realisation of freedom is complicated by love‟s drives. Here 
freedom has a positive character and it speaks to concepts of self-realisation, tyranny 
and conquest. Mackay was under no illusions about the costs of this form of freedom 
but it was Marsden who put the point most powerfully. The illusion of love, she 
noted, was that „one seems to desire not one‟s own interests but another‟s‟. In reality 
„the lover is a tyrant kept within bounds by the salutary fear that the substance of his 
desire will slip from his grasp: whereas his paramount interest is to retain his hold on 
it‟.83  
From Marden‟s perspective Mackay‟s ideal of liberal freedom drew him closer 
to the clerico-libertarian position than she could countenance. Veering towards 
existentialism, she treated the ego as a plain fact – a mere „unit of life‟ - and rejected 
all notions that it described a moral category.
84
 The statements „I am‟, „I feel‟, „I live‟, 
„I sense‟, „I exist‟, she argued, were all instances of „an assertion made twice‟. The 
„“I”‟, she continued, „is the comprehensive expression of existence as viewed by the 
only unit competent to view it: the one who exists‟.85 As Bruce Clarke argues, her 
view was that the ego was not „referable, is not to be referred to any idea, 
emphatically not to Statist ideas. Rather, for their worth ideas are to be referred to 
selves and their several purposes‟.86  
The differences resulted in two alternative conceptions of anarchist or archist 
union. For both, egoism justified narrowly self-centred behaviour, enabling 
individuals to take what they could from others in the fulfilment of desire. But 
Mackay identified anarchy as a condition in which mutual independence was 
supported by conventions designed to empower individuals, where the strong were no 
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longer told to „“Become weak!”‟ but the weak were exhorted to „“Become strong!”‟87 
Archy provided space for custom, but Marsden defined this as „habitual conduct‟ to 
which „public opinion attaches small weight either by way of approval or disapproval‟ 
contrasting it to morality, which she dismissed as custom backed by authority.
88
 
Rather than seeing property as a right or a guarantee of independence, she saw it 
merely as „“one‟s own‟”, a principle of mastership limited only by the will.89 
Mackay‟s ideal was sensual and egalitarian. Archy was combative and the continuous 
transgression Marsden embraced assumed a moral orthodoxy against which to 
transgress.  
Mackay and Marsden offered different diagnoses of anarchist failure. Mackay 
identified the communists‟ error in pity. Their sentimental reaction to injustice placed 
them in a protective relationship with the disadvantaged and misled them into 
supposing that compassion was a natural human response to suffering and, therefore, 
that it provided a moral foundation for a self-regulating society – a belief he 
characterised as utopian. Marsden‟s view was similar, though she seemed unsure 
whether the anarchists were deluded or fraudulent: either they were too stupid to see 
that human actions were always self-regarding or they were Machiavellian and 
elevated ideas of altruism and sacrifice as a political ruse. In any case, their doctrine 
was just another ideological barrier to the assertive ego. However, whereas Mackay‟s 
worry was that individuals would be unable to pattern their behaviours in the ways 
that anarcho-communists desired without the use of force, her concern was that they 
were all too malleable and could be endlessly patterned. Similarly, whilst Mackay 
criticised anarcho-communists for subordinating reason to passion and identified the 
danger of sentiments with ruinous protest, Marsden accused the anarchists of stifling 
the ego‟s dynamic, vital energy and saw in morality only disciplining power.  
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The Stirnerism of both Mackay and Marsden dovetails with Newman‟s in a 
number of areas. All share the suspicion of utopianism, the rejection of causes and the 
celebration of difference, autonomy and inventiveness. Yet neither version of egoism 
maps neatly onto his account; the mirror they hold up to anarchism reflects a different 
image from the one he finds. Newman rightly sets Stirner‟s thought in the context of a 
debate about Hegelianism and traces a counter-dialectic to contest a concept of 
evolution in which individuals (citizens or comrades) overcome their alienation to 
realise themselves in ethical union.
90
 In contrast, Mackay and Marsden are inspired by 
Tucker and Proudhonian mutualism and use this as the springboard for their critiques. 
As Riley notes, philosophical interpretations of Stirner‟s Young Heglianism drew 
nothing from Mackay and he, in turn, took from The Ego and Its Own „only what he 
desired, not what others told him was there‟.91 His and Marsden‟s complaint was not 
that anarchist theory was based on an abstract conception of the citizen/comrade, but 
that the adoption of socialist doctrines squeezed out and conditioned the space for 
self-assertion. The conclusion is similar, but for Mackay and Marsden, the litmus test 
of anarchist failure was the elevation of conscience and the demand for compassion or 
- in Marsden‟s case - public concern or interest in others, not the denial of difference.  
How far either Mackay or Marsden faithfully interpreted Stirner is a moot 
point. Riley suggests that Mackay‟s was a more unsocial doctrine than Stirner ever 
propounded.
92
 Steven Lukes‟s sketch of Stirner closes the gap. Stirner, he argues, took 
the „German idea of individuality ... as a cult of individual genius and originality ... 
stressing the conflict between individual and society and the supreme value of 
subjectivity‟ and turned it into „an uninhibited quest for eccentricity and ... the purist 
egoism and social nihilism‟.93 However the relationship between Stirner, Mackay and 
Marsden is understood, Lukes‟s view perfectly captures the gap between them and 
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Newman. This difference is instructive because it allows greater scope for dialogue 
between anarchists than Newman‟s Stirnerism suggests. For example, it is possible to 
accept Mackay‟s and Marsden‟s anxieties about the domination of causes whilst 
challenging their rejection of promising and conscience. Likewise, it is possible to 
embrace the egoist celebration of experimentation and self-expression without 
endorsing egotistical behaviours, as Marsden and Mackay allow. To reject hedonism 
on Marsden‟s model in favour of sociability is not to call for uniformity, but a 
challenge to her defence of might as the only measure of right and her idea that 
conscience is a weakness which „shrinks‟ as the ego becomes „more powerful and 
more aware‟.94 Mackay‟s rejection of pity as dangerously utopian is also too stark in 
the choice it presents and fails adequately to distinguish between love for intimates 
and compassion for strangers. As Antliff suggests, the spaces that turn-of-the-century 
anarchists and anarcho-communists occupied in their engagement with individualism 
still exist. Their rediscovery requires that the mirror Stirner holds up to anarchism 
reflects both ways.  
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